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Abstract
This Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s shift from the insulating the woman in her
private choice to allowing the community greater scope to encourage her to exercise her choice in
a manner the community considers reflective and responsible, a shift that parallels the French and
Italian abortion legislation.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY: FROM U.S.
"RIGHTS TALK" TO WESTERN EUROPEAN
"RESPONSIBILITY TALK"*
INTRODUCTION
U.S. legal tradition, influenced by eighteenth century dis-
course concerning the individual's right to life, liberty, and
property,' developed an individualistic, rights-based legal phi-
losophy that constitutionally protected citizens in their private
lives.2 The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally has interpreted
the U.S. Constitution to insulate certain fundamental rights
from state control.3 Generally, "taking rights seriously" 4 in
* The author wishes to thank James E. Fleming, Associate Professor of Law at
Fordham University School of Law, for his insight, assistance and patience in the
production of this Note.
1. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) (stating that "the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-the
right to be let alone"); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J. dissenting) (asserting that "[t]he makers of our Constitution... conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."); cf ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF
THE HEART 142 (1985) (asserting that individualism, pursuit of individual rights, and
individual autonomy "lies at the very core of American culture").
2. LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 92 (1990) [hereinafter
TRIBE, ABORTION]. Since the landmark cases Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, the U.S. Supreme Court has protected cer-
tain private decisions of individuals. Id.; see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (holding that right to bring up children is protected by 14th Amendment);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding that right of parents to direct upbringing and education of children is pro-
tected).
3. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (protecting unenumerated right to marry, establish
home and bring up children as fundamental); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that decisions related to child bearing and contraception
are protected as fundamental); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 48 (1991) [herein-
after GLENDON, RIGHTS] (arguing that possessing rights in U.S. political culture
means insulating individuals from community scrutiny and upholding the individual
as "self-determining, unencumbered, individual, a being connected to others only by
choice"); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosex-
uality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527-28 (1989) (discussing that rights-centered U.S. tradi-
tion endowed individuals with freedom to make certain choices without governmen-
tal interference); Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV.
43, 81 (1990) (discussing Supreme Court's traditional protection of rights as insulat-
ing right holder from public scrutiny).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 204-05 (1977). "Taking rights
seriously" means protecting certain individual rights, namely fundamental rights,
from community control. Id. Protecting rights in this manner best secures the right
and provides a meaningful understanding of the right as free from inspection. Id.
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U.S. political culture has meant that in order to preserve fun-
damental rights, the Court insulated individuals from commu-
nity scrutiny to secure liberty.5
Consistent with this approach, Roe v. Wade6 established
that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is a consti-
tutionally protected fundamental right that a state may not re-
strict during the first trimester of pregnancy.7 This decision is
said to have exemplified the "lone rights-bearer" ethic of U.S.
legal tradition which effectively glorifies the independent, self-
sufficient individual by insulating the individual from state in-
terference.8 In the wake of Roe, the U.S. public has fought bit-
terly over the abortion issue.9 The abortion debate has been
According to Professor Dworkin, "[o]ur constitutional system rests on a particular
moral theory, namely, that men have moral rights against the state." Id. at 147. But
see GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 4 (criticizing notion of taking rights seriously in
U.S. legal tradition). In the 1960s, the Supreme Court principally focused on pro-
tecting personal liberties by incorporating the Bill of Rights as binding on the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 5. The Warren Court vigorously exercised the
power ofjudicial review as a means of protecting individual rights from interference
by state governments as well as the federal government. Id. at 5 n. 11. According to
Professor Glendon, "[t]oday the bulk of the Court's constitutional work involves
claims that individual rights have been violated." Id. For Professor Glendon, the
Warren Court's expansive interpretation of many constitutional rights related to per-
sonal liberty sparked a rights revolution. Id. This rights revolution has consumed
the collective thinking of U.S. political culture and the judiciary. Id. This collective
thinking focuses on protecting rights, not encouraging responsibilities. Id. at 7.
Such "rights talk" inhibits dialogue that might lead to consensus. Id. at 14. For
Professor Glendon, rights talk, in its absoluteness, condones living in a democratic
society without accepting corresponding obligations to the community. Id. But see
Jane Maslow Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235,
1238 (1989) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1989)). The U.S. legal tradition's
preoccupation with rights best secures freedoms that compromise legislation aimed
at civic responsibility fail to protect. Id.
5. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519 (1992).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Id. at 163.
8. Id. at 113; see GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 47. According to Professor
Glendon, the "image of the rights-bearer is an exaggerated form of a common mod-
ern ideal that has many attractive features." Id. U.S. legal scholarship endows indi-
viduals with certain inalienable rights such as the right to privacy. Id. U.S. legal
tradition, however, fails to examine an individual's responsibility to the community.
Id.
9. See Slaying in Pensacola: A Doctor Pays With His Life In the War Over Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, March 14, 1993, at E2 (discussing murder of physician who performed abor-
tions by Michael Griffin, recent convert to anti-abortion cause); see also TRIBE, ABOR-
TION, supra note 2, at 92 (discussing abortion community in U.S. legal system); Rob-
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characterized as a clash of absolutes:" ° a struggle between two
mutually exclusive interests, the pregnant woman's right to
privacy and the state's interest in the life of the fetus." The
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services1 2 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' 3 however, dra-
matically departed from the Court's previous insulation of a
woman's right to choose in the first trimester.1 4 In Casey, the
Court allowed greater scope for the community's interest in
ensuring that the pregnant woman makes her decision
thoughtfully, and hence, more responsibly. 5
While the U.S. public remained entangled in debate re-
garding the abortion issue, two Western European countries,
France and Italy, each forged a national consensus by passing
compromise legislation regarding the abortion issue in the
1970s. 6 The French Abortion Law of 197517 and the Italian
ert Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad
Law, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 978, 981 n.14 (1981) (stating that within one year after Roe
approximately 30 constitutional amendments were introduced in Congress to over-
turn Roe); TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 142-60 (discussing groups that formed
to conduct either pro-choice or anti-abortion activities).
10. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 1.
11. Id.
12. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
13. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
14. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. Justice O'Connor's joint opinion for the Court
asserts "[w]hat is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so." Id.
15. Id. at 2821. According to the joint opinion in Casey, "[tihough the woman
has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does
not follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is
thoughtful and informed." Id. at 2818; see Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 92 U. CHI. L. REV. 408 (1992) (arguing that
state regulations aimed at encouraging women to make their decisions concerning
abortion more reflectively ultimately satisfies the community's goal to encourage
civic responsibility). Professor Dworkin contended that "[a] state might aim that its
citizens treat decisions about abortion as matters of moral importance, that they rec-
ognize that fundamental intrinsic values are at stake in their decision, and that they
decide reflectively, not out of immediate convenience but out of examined convic-
tion." Id. Such regulations serve the state and its community's goal of encouraging
women considering abortion to be more "responsible." Id.; see West, supra note 3, at
79. Society's effort to protect individual rights renders itself meaningless without
individuals exercising responsibility. Id. Professor West argues that "[ulnless we
also deepen our respect for the responsibilities entailed by the freedoms of a liberal
society, those liberties will remain insecure." Id.
16. See Law No. 75-177, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by Law No. 79-
1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff.
3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
764 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:761
Abortion Law of 1978'8 both carefully balanced the woman's
right to choose an abortion and the community's interest in
promoting life. 9 The legalization of abortion in France20 and
in Italy2 demanded reflective decision-making by the pregnant
woman with the help of her partner, doctors, and social work-
ers. 2 2 In sum, the present Italian and French abortion laws ef-
fectively de-criminalized abortion, wedded the interests of the
pregnant woman's right to choose with the interests of her
partner and her community, fully funded her choice in either
having an abortion or giving birth, and largely settled the con-
tested issue of abortion in those two countries.23
This Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's shift from
insulating the woman in her private choice to allowing the
community greater scope to encourage her to exercise her
choice in a manner the community considers reflective and re-
sponsible, a shift that parallels the French and Italian abortion
legislation. Part I addresses the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence concerning abortion. Part II examines the French and
Italian community-oriented approach to resolving the abortion
issue. Part III argues that the Supreme Court's recent Webster
and Casey decisions represent a move towards the Western Eu-
ropean example. This Note concludes that the Court's recent
decisions incompletely mimic the Western European commu-
LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 18, 22 n.51 [hereinafter GLENDON,
ABORTION] (discussing 1975 French abortion law and 1978 Italian abortion law).
17. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
18. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
19. See Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978
Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 18-22
(1987) (discussing compromise legislation of France and Italy).
20. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
21. Law No. 140, pt. 1, arts. 5, 14, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
22. See C. Massimo Bianca, Il Problema DellAborto: Interessi Tutelati E Scelte Sociali,
22(I) RIVISTA DI DIRjrro CIVILE 225 (1976) (discussing counseling requirement in-
cluded in 1978 Italian abortion law); see also Jacques Robert, La Dicision du Conseil
Constitutionnel du 15Janvier 1975 Sur L interruption Volontaire de Grossesse, 27 REV. INT. D.
CoMp. 56 (1975) (discussing counseling requirement included in 1975 French abor-
tion law).
23. See Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, May 22,
1978, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at
21-22 n.51 (discussing French and Italian legislation).
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nitarian ethic. Allowing U.S. legislatures to impose community
values upon the woman who considers an abortion, 24 as the
Western Europeans do, while failing to pay for her choice, re-
sounds of hypocrisy. Legislatures should recognize that asking
the woman to act responsibly in an effort to satisfy the commu-
nity's values demands reciprocity from the community. Ac-
cordingly, the community must take responsibility for its own
restrictions by paying for the woman's choice.
I. ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
In Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
established a woman's right to choose an abortion as a funda-
mental right deserving judicial protection. 25  Following Roe,
the Court initially insulated the woman's decision from state
regulations in the first trimester.2 6 The Court, however,
changed its approach in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services27
by upholding state regulation of the woman's decision in the
first trimester.28 Moreover, the Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey29 approved a state regulation that required that the wo-
man wait twenty-four hours to ponder her decision and hence
presumably to be more reflective in her choice.3 0 Against the
backdrop of these decisions, the Court consistently refused to
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). As long as the legisla-
tion does not unduly burden the woman's ultimate decision to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability, the Court will uphold state legislation regulating abortion. Id.
at 2821.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy .... This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at
152-53 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
26. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983)
(striking down state regulations that influenced woman's decision in first trimester
such as 24-hour waiting period), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2818 (1992) (upholding state regulations in first trimester including 24-hour
waiting period); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764-72 (1986) (protecting woman's decision in first trimester
from state regulations and finding unconstitutional reporting requirement in first tri-
mester), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821 (1992)
(holding reporting requirement in first trimester constitutional).
27. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
28. Id. at 522-26.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
30. Id. at 2825.
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mandate federal and state funding of the woman's fundamen-
tal right to elect an abortion.3  As the Court has tapered its
decisions to accommodate the community's concerns, some
constitutional scholars similarly have sought compromise to
get beyond the clash of absolutes.32
A. Historical Constitutional Protection of Abortion in the
United States
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade33 held that a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy was a fundamental right
deserving constitutional protection by the Court.34 In the
years following Roe, the Court zealously protected the woman
in the first trimester from community scrutiny regarding her
abortion decision.35 Beginning with Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 3 6 the Court altered its previous decisions by al-
lowing states to impose restrictions upon the woman during
and after the first trimester.3 7 Meanwhile, the Court consist-
ently refused to recognize a governmental duty to fund a wo-
man's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
38
1. Protecting a Woman's Right to Choose: The Landmark
Decision of Roe v. Wade
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade31 took the
31. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal govern-
ment's denial of funding for non-medical emergency abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding government's refusal to fund abortions as constitu-
tional).
32. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 208 (advocating compromise solutions
and apparently altering his firm support of unrestricted right to terminate preg-
nancy); Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds!, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Aug. 13, 1992, at 29
[hereinafter Dworkin, Center] (supporting compromise proposals and apparently
shifting his position as fundamental rights advocate).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Id. at 159.
35. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding
unconstitutional regulations in first trimester), overruled by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992) (upholding 24-hour waiting period restriction as
constitutional).
36. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
37. Id. at 519-22; see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (hold-
ing state restrictions in first trimester constitutional unless unduly burdensome).
38. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (holding that federal government was not constitutionally required to fund
abortions).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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resolution of abortion restrictions away from state legisla-
tures" and placed it in the hands of thejudiciary.4 t Appreciat-
ing the divisive nature of the abortion issue,42 the Court held
that a woman's right to privacy4 3 endowed her with a judicially
protected fundamental right to choose an abortion." The
40. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 29. State legislatures began regulating
abortion in the 1800s. Id. Influenced by medical professionals concerned with un-
safe abortions, 40 state legislatures passed criminal anti-abortion statutes. Id. The
anti-abortion statutes permitted abortions only where a physician deemed the proce-
dure necessary to preserve the life of the woman. Id. at 34. Despite the widespread
practice of illegal abortions in the 1800s, states rarely prosecuted women for illegal
abortions. Id. Illegal abortion, the third largest illegal enterprise in the 1960s,
threatened lives of women due to the poor quality of such services. Id. ; see NANETrE
DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ABORTION IN AMERICA 98
(1985). Forcing women to seek life-threatening illegal abortions, the restrictive abor-
tion policies discriminated most severely against women of low socio-economic status
and pregnant teenagers. Id.; see TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 47. Influenced by
the fear of unsafe clandestine abortions and medical developments advancing the
safety of abortion procedures, physicians and women's groups lobbied to reform the
strict abortion laws in the 1960s. See id. In 1970, Hawaii became the first state to
repeal its criminal abortion law, legalizing abortions performed before the 20th week
of pregnancy. See id. That same year, Alaska and New York joined Hawaii by repeal-
ing their criminal abortion statutes. See id. at 49. Washington followed suit with a
popular referendum. See id.
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. The Court held that regulations limiting abortions in
the first trimester "may be justified only by a compelling state interest." Id. at 155.
42. Id. Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun stressed the
Court's "awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion contro-
versy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires." Id.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Following a line of cases recognizing the right of per-
sonal privacy, the Court reasoned that such a privacy right, whether it be found in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty or in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, "is broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. Laurence Tribe describes Roe
as standing for a line of cases that affirm the value of reproductive autonomy over
majoritarian control such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 932 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN]. But see GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as first judicial protection of reproductive autonomy).
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The Court recognized the State's legitimate interest in
the health of the mother only at the end of the first trimester. Id. Prior to the end of
the first trimester, "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the pa-
tient's pregnancy should be terminated." Id. at 163. Accordingly, the woman's deci-
sion in the first trimester is "free of interference by the State." Id.; see TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN, supra note 43, at 924. Because the woman's right to choose an abortion ranks
fundamental in the first trimester, only a compelling state interest can justify state
regulation impinging upon that right. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. According to Nanette
Davis, Roe's enunciation of the rights of women to abortion hinged on the assump-
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Court mandated that the decision-making authority in the first
trimester remained with the woman and her physician alone
and did not belong to a governmental agency or to the wo-
man's partner or family.45
The Court, however, declared that the pregnant woman
cannot be totally isolated in her privacy. 46 The state's interest
in regulating abortion to protect the woman's health became
compelling only after the first trimester, and its interest in pro-
tecting the potential life of the fetus became compelling only
after the second trimester.47 Thus, Roe's trimester scheme ef-
fectively insulated the woman's decision from state regulation
in the first trimester.48
tion of a number of legal fictions: that rights are automatically translatable into medi-
cal and social programs; that public, legislative, and judicial support would be forth-
coming (day care centers, federal funding for abortions); that physicians would sup-
port women's choices despite pressure from anti-abortion groups; and that the
individual woman could demand rights in the absence of legal and medical support.
DAVIS, supra note 40, at 98.
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Laurence Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1973) [hereinafter Tribe, Foreword].
The Court chose among "alternative allocations of decision-making authority, for the
issue it faced was whether the woman and her doctor, rather than an agency or gov-
ernment, should have the authority to make the abortion decision at various stages of
pregnancy." Id. at 11. But see TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 43, at 928 (repudiating, in
part, his support of Roe by stating "Roe must be wrong if it rests on the premise that
a state can never interfere with individual decisions with only moral justification").
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159; see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 549 (1989) (Blackmun J., dissenting). "The trimester framework simply defines
and limits that right to privacy in the abortion context to accommodate, not destroy,
a State's legitimate interest in protecting the health of pregnant women and in pre-
serving potential human life." Id.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. During the first trimester, states were permitted only
to require that the abortion be performed by a licensed physician. Id. at 165. No
further restrictions peculiar to abortion were justified as "compelling" in that period.
Id. at 163. The state's legitimate interest in the health of the pregnant woman be-
comes compelling at the end of the first trimester. Id. The state may regulate the
abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preser-
vation and protection of the pregnant woman's health. Id. The state's important and
legitimate interest in potential life are "compelling" at viability of the fetus. Id.
States may proscribe abortion during that period except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother. Id.
48. Id. at 163. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, decried the major-
ity's decision by asserting that "the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth
Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this mat-
ter." Id. at 177.
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2. Insulating the Woman's Decision-Making Process in the
First Trimester from Community Scrutiny:
Akron and Thornburg
Underscoring the importance of a woman's personal lib-
erty concerning abortion, the Supreme Court's initial decisions
following Roe protected the woman's autonomy in her decision
to terminate her pregnancy.4 9 Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc. 50 involved a statute regulating abortion in
the first trimester.5 ' The statute required the physician to in-
form the pregnant woman that the unborn child is human life
from the moment of conception, to describe the fetus, and to
order a twenty-four-hour delay before the woman could obtain
an abortion.52 Finding the regulations unconstitutional, the
Court guarded a woman's fundamental right to make her deci-
sion privately by holding that only first trimester regulations
that do not significantly impact on the woman's choice are con-
stitutional. 53 Although acknowledging Roe's assertion that the
woman's fundamental right to decide is not unqualified, the
Court proscribed all state regulation of abortions during the
first trimester.54 Thus, the Court in Akron effectively insulated
a woman's private decision in the first trimester from state in-
terference by prohibiting state restrictions upon the woman's
choice and striking down a state-imposed waiting period. 55
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
49. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71-72 (1976). The Court in
Danforth explained that government may not interfere with a woman's abortion deci-
sion by giving a veto over the abortion to the husband or even by conferring a veto
upon a minor woman's parents. Id.
50. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2825 (1992) (regarding constitutionality of state-imposed 24-hour waiting pe-
riods).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 417.
53. Id. at 420. The statute also required physicians to perform abortions in hos-
pitals, rather than in clinics. Id. Because a second-trimester abortion costs twice as
much in a hospital as in a clinic and may limit a woman's ability to obtain an abortion,
the Court held the hospitalization requirement unconstitutional. Id. Protecting the
woman's right to make her decision free from the state's influence, the Court struck
down the information provision. Id.
54. Id. at 421. The Court stressed that only after the first trimester may states
regulate abortion. Id. States may protect the life of the fetus only after viability and
the State may protect maternal health in the second and third trimesters. Id.
55. Id.
7691992-1993]
770 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLIWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:761
gists,5 6 the Court protected the woman's abortion decision
from a legislature's attempt to influence her choice.5 7  Thorn-
burgh involved a Pennsylvania statute instructing the physician
to present information describing the fetus to the woman, to
meet detailed reporting requirements, and to perform special
procedures to determine viability.5 Striking down the re-
quirements,59 the Court held that the regulations posed an un-
acceptable danger of deterring the woman's exercise of the
fundamental right to end a pregnancy.6 Accordingly, the
Court found that the state regulations unconstitutionally
subordinated the woman's constitutional right of privacy by at-
tempting to prevent a woman from making a decision that,
with her physician, is solely hers to make. 6' Expanding the
reasoning of Roe, the Court's Thornburgh decision exalted the
woman's privacy right as a right to make the choice freely and
unencumbered by any state regulation in the first trimester.62
56. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2832 (1992) (regarding reporting requirements).
57. Id. at 772. Speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun asserted that "States
are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimi-
date women into continuing pregnancies." Id. at 759.
58. Id. at 747.
59. Id. at 770-71. The Court found that the Pennsylvania requirements violated
a woman's constitutional right to choose an abortion. Id.; see Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484
U.S. 171 (1987) (holding unconstitutional Illinois statute requiring that pregnant
minor wait 24 hours after notifying both parents of her abortion decision).
60. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772, overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (regarding reporting requirements). Justice Blackmun as-
serted that "[i]n the years since this Court's decision in Roe, states and municipalities
have adopted a number of measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with
the advice of her physician, from exercising her freedom of choice." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Justice Blackmun asserted for the Court that
[o]ur cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise
that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond
the reach of government. That promise extends to women as well as to
men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private,
or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's deci-
sion-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits of Roe-
whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely
is fundamental.
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3. Moving a Woman's Choice into the Arena of Public
Scrutiny-"Responsibility Talk" as Opposed to
"Rights Talk": Webster and Casey
In 1989, the Court retreated from its previous decisions
that essentially protected women from community scrutiny in
the first and second trimesters.63 In the Webster decision, a di-
vided Court upheld a Missouri statute that provided for
mandatory fetal viability testing when a doctor believed the
woman to be more than twenty weeks pregnant, prohibited the
use of public facilities to perform abortions, and prohibited
public funding of abortion counseling.64 Because no single
opinion was endorsed by the majority of the justices,65 Justice
O'Connor's opinion was crucial in defining the Court's hold-
ing.66 Justice O'Connor reasoned that state regulations of
abortion should be upheld as long as they do not "unduly bur-
den" a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy.6 7 Webster
marked the end of the Court's protection of the woman's
choice as insulated from state regulation in the first trimester
of pregnancy.68
63. Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519-22
(1989) (upholding state regulations in first trimester) with Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772
(holding Pennsylvania regulations in first trimester unconstitutional in order to fulfill
Constitution's promise "that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
largely beyond the reach of government").
64. Webster, 492 U.S. at 522-26.
65. Id. at 498-99. With four votes to overturn Roe and four to uphold it, Justice
O'Connor in 1989 became the swing vote regarding the permissibility of the state
abortion legislation in Webster. Id. at 522; see Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Abortion Politics: Writing For an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 122 (1989)
(arguing that fractured Webster decided nothing at all).
66. Webster, 492 U.S. at 522.
67. Id. at 530 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)).
68. Id. at 537-38 (BlackmunJ., dissenting). Speaking on behalf ofJustices Bren-
nan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun lamented the plurality's decision to subject a
woman's private decision to the "coercive and brooding influence of the State." Id. at
538. ForJustice Blackmun, women's liberty to control their destinies are jeopardized
by the "chill wind" of the plurality opinion. Id. at 560; see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding written parental notice requirement
for minors seeking abortions); see also Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103
HARV. L. REV. 105, 133 (1989) ("The Webster case threatens to unravel not only the
compromise of Roe, but also the compromise of women's accepting the legitimacy of
law by accepting that the law is neutral and objective."); cf James Bopp, Jr. & Richard
E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1989) (arguing that
Webster de facto overruled Roe and its progeny).
1992-19931
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,69 the Court in its joint opin-'
ion confirmed its commitment to uphold state regulations
aimed at making the woman's decision more thoughtful. 70 The
regulations imposed a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting pe-
riod, an informed consent requirement, and parental consent
and spousal notification requirements.71 While reaffirming the
right of a woman to make the ultimate decision regarding
whether to terminate her pregnancy, the Casey Court held all
the Pennsylvania restrictions constitutional, except for the
spousal notification requirement.72 The Court reasoned that
the regulations did not unduly burden the pregnant woman's
ultimate choice.73
Rejecting Roe's insulation of a woman's first trimester
choice from state influence, 4 the joint opinion stated that a
woman has only the right to choose an abortion without undue
interference from the state.75 The joint opinion declared that
a woman has the right ultimately to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy but not to be insulated from others in so
doing.76 Thus, Casey seemed to mark a shift from emphasizing
a virtually absolute individual fundamental right to underscor-
ing an individual's responsibility to the community to exercise
that choice reflectively.77
The Casey joint opinion describes the woman's decision as
an act fraught with consequences not only for the woman but
also for others concerned with fetal life, including the doctors
performing the operation, the spouse, and the family. 78 De-
parting from the sole concern of Roe and its progeny to protect
69. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
70. Id. at 2818.
71. Id. at 2791.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing Roe's insulation of
women in first trimester from community scrutiny).
75. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. Asserting that the state may not compel or enforce
one view or another concerning abortion, the joint opinion permits states to influ-
ence the woman's opinion so long as that influence does not unduly burden the wo-
man's ultimate choice. Id. at 2819.
76. Id. at 2821.
77. See GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 59 (asserting that paradigm of lone
rights-bearer prevailed in Roe).
78. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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the woman from community scrutiny in the first trimester,7 9
the joint opinion stated that the abortion decision entails re-
spect for procreation in light of community values.80 Because
the state should be permitted to show its concern for the life of
the unborn at the outset of a woman's pregnancy,8' the Court
held that states may enact twenty-four-hour waiting periods to
encourage the woman to be more "thoughtful" in her deci-
sion.82 The Court supported a state's decision to present to
the woman "philosophic and social arguments" to influence
her choice.83 Seeking to make the woman's decision more
thoughtful and to ensure that the woman consider arguments
in favor of continuing her pregnancy, the joint opinion as-
serted that states can make laws to ensure that the woman's
decision has profound and lasting meaning. 84 Casey appears to
depart from Roe and its progeny by permitting states to require
that the woman's choice be more thoughtful.85
79. Compare supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburgh's
protection of the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy because "[a] woman's
right to make that choice freely is fundamental") with Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (hold-
ing that states may presently seek to dissuade woman from terminating her preg-
nancy in first trimester).
80. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
81. Id. at 2816.
82. Id. at 2818.
83. Id. Accordingly, "the Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant
to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth." Id.
(citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)). But see
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Stevens disagreed that a 24-hour waiting period would result in a more informed
and thoughtful decision. Id. Justice Stevens contended that the presumption that
prolonging a woman's decision will make her choice more informed is false. Id. Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that
No person undertakes such a decision lightly-and States may not presume
that a woman has failed to reflect adequately merely because her conclusion
differs from the State's preference. A woman who has, in the privacy of her
thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her decision can-
not be forced to reconsider all, simply because the State believes she has
come to the wrong conclusion.
Id.
84. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
85. Compare id. (holding that states may encourage woman to be more thought-
ful in her abortion decision in first trimester) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973) (state interest regarding fetus becomes compelling only in third trimester) and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (striking down all state regulations in first trimester), overruled by Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2832 (upholding reporting requirement in first trimester).
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4. Refusing to Fund Abortions: Harris v. McRae
For the Supreme Court, constitutionally protecting a wo-
man's right to choose an abortion from burdensome state reg-
ulation does not imply a reciprocal state responsibility to fund
a woman's choice.8 6 In Harris v. McRae,8 7 the Court examined
the Hyde Amendment88 which prohibited any use of Medicaid
funds for abortion except for life-threatening situations. 89 The
Court held that a woman's freedom of choice does not entail a
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail
herself of that choice. 90 The Court proclaimed that Congress'
refusal to provide funding for indigent women seeking abor-
tions did not violate a constitutionally protected fundamental
right.9' It reasoned that resolving the funding question prop-
erly lay with the legislature. 2 Allowing the government to cut
86. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (holding that government may
withhold all public funds from elective abortions even if public funds are made avail-
able to same women for expenses of childbirth); see also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S.
358 (1980) (holding that state government was not constitutionally required to fund
abortions). The Court's denial of abortion funding followed the logic of Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), that problems posed by public welfare assistance
programs were not the business of the Court. Maher, 432 U.S. at 480; cf. DeShaney v.
Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that government has
no affirmative duty to act even where such actions may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property).
87. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
88. H.R. Res. 14232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. Res. 412, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1979); H.R. Res. 440, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
89. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 297. The Hyde Amendment, a series of amendments
to congressional appropriations bills at issue in McRae, limited the spending of fed-
eral funds to abortions following rape or medical necessity to save the mother's life.
Id. This amendment stipulated that the freedom to have an abortion, like the free-
dom to use contraceptives or to attend private school, is not accompanied by a grant
of money in the Constitution. Id.; see Olsen, supra note 68, at 106 n.7 (discussing that
Hyde Amendment's funding cutoff endangered women's health because sometimes it
was extended to bar funding for medically necessary abortions and in cases where
woman's health but not life was threatened by pregnancy); see also Harris, 448 U.S. at
354 (Stevens J., dissenting) (stating that Harris decision "exclu[ded] benefits in 'in-
stances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage' may result from fail-
ure to abort pregnancy").
90. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. Finding the Hyde Amendment constitutional, the
Court reasoned that an affirmative funding obligation for abortions cannot be found
in the Due Process Clause. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. But see Harris, 448 U.S. at 329 (1980) (Brennan J., dissenting). Speaking
on behalf of Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan emphasized that
the denial of public funds plainly intruded upon the woman's constitutionally pro-
tected decision. Id. The denial of funds, according to Justice Brennan, coerces the
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off Medicaid funding for non-therapeutic abortions,9" Harris
established that a woman's abortion decision involved a nega-
tive right, the right to be shielded from intrusive state regula-
tions. Accordingly, the Court instructed that the fundamental
right to abortion did not entail the state's affirmative duty to
fund the woman's decision.94 Harris ultimately saddles a wo-
man with the duty to make a thoughtful decision without rec-
ognizing the community's affirmative duty to fund the woman's
decision.95
B. The Current Debate: A Call to Compromise?
The Supreme Court's recognition of a judicially protected
fundamental right to choose an abortion drives public debate
away from deal-making legislatures to the Court, an arena of
abstract constitutional principles.9 6 Scholarly debate after Roe
examined whether principles underlying the Constitution af-
forded protection for the woman's abortion decision or urged
leaving the question to the state legislatures.97 The debate
indigent pregnant woman to bear her child. Id. Such coercion defeats the basic con-
stitutional guarantees provided by Roe and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause. Id.
93. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 223. In the wake of cutting Medicare funding for
non-therapeutic abortions, many low-income women resorted to self-induced or ille-
gal abortions. Id. According to the Centers for Disease Control, there were an esti-
mated 5000 to 23,000 women obtaining. illegal abortions, involving approximately 17
deaths per year, from 1975 to 1979. Id. at 223; see Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 531 (1989) (Blackmun J., dissenting). "Every year, many women,
especially poor and minority women, would die or suffer debilitating physical trauma,
all in the name of enforced morality or religious dictates or lack of compassion, as it
may be." Id. at 588; see TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 43, at 931. For Professor Tribe,
denying women funding for abortions undermines the force of Roe's rationale, forc-
ing poor women back to the choice between childbirth and unsafe illegal abortions as
prior to 1973. Id. at 933. Failing to fund abortions mirrors the extraordinary polit-
ical and moral difficulty of carrying Roe to its logical conclusion, rather than any prin-
cipled distinction concerning the role of governmental interference. Id. Professor
Tribe believes that Maher and its progeny fail to adhere to the principles of Roe. Id.
Politics permits decreeing that the very poor must choose between childbirth and the
most hazardous clandestine abortion, while the Constitution protects the right of the
wealthy to choose safe abortions even if they can afford children. Id. at 934. Accord-
ing to Professor Tribe, if Roe was right, then Maher was wrong. Id.
94. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
95. See West, supra note 3, at 84 (arguing for reproductive responsibility accom-
panied by state funding).
96. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 3.
97. See Tribe, Foreword, supra note 43, at 1 (stating that there is no doubt that
what Roe decision concerns, liberty, is fit subject for judicial protection); see also Ron-
776 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:761
centered on the breadth of fundamental rights.9" Scholarly di-
alogue, however, has since subtly shifted from talk of protect-
ing absolute fundamental rights to talk of attaining compro-
mise or consensus concerning this divisive issue. 99
1. The Call to Bring the Decision Back to the Legislatures
Many conservative and liberal scholars share the notion
that the resolution of the abortion question properly belongs
to the people and their elected representatives."' Adhering
to a narrow understanding of the U.S. Constitution's Framers,
conservative originalists reject constitutional protection of
abortion and urge deferring the decision to legislatures.1"'
Comparative legal scholars'0 2 and those commentators who
advocate the theory that courts should reinforce representative
democracy, rather than protect fundamental rights, 0 3 arrive at
aid Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BooKs,June 29, 1989, at 51 [hereinaf-
ter Dworkin, Great] (stating that Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause sup-
ports principle that people have right to decide for themselves ethical and personal
issues arising from marriage and procreation). But see John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 932 (1973) [hereinafter Ely,
Wages] (arguing that abortion question should be left to state legislatures).
98. See Tribe, Foreword, supra note 45, at 1 (discussing principles of individual
privacy underlying Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause). But see ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 169 (1990) (asserting that Fourteenth Amendment
does not permit "inventing" fundamental right to abortion).
99. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be
Overruled, 59 U. CI. L. REV. 381, 407 (1992) (considering compromise as solution to
bring together competing conceptions).
100. See BORK, supra note 98, at 169 (adhering to conservative originalist school
of constitutional theory); cf. Ely, Wages, supra note 97, at 932 (supporting constitu-
tional theory of reinforcing representative democracy); see Michael Perry, Abortion, the
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976) (supporting liberal fundamental rights theory); see also
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 3 (1991) (supporting conservative fundamental
rights theory).
101. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 98, at 169.
102. See GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 45-46 (arguing that abortion law
should be formulated by compromise legislation). Comparative legal scholars com-
pare the legal systems of countries in order to "see how [countries] have dealt with
problems similar to ours." Id. at 1.
103. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980). The constitutional
theory of reinforcing representative democracy urges the Court to act as a referee to
ensure that the political process is not constricted and individuals are not denied the
right to vote. Id. More importantly, the Court must protect powerless minorities.
Id. at 151. But following this theory, the Court should not protect unenumerated
fundamental rights such as the right of a woman to choose an abortion. Id. at 66.
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the same conclusion with significantly different reasoning. 104
For these commentators, legislative resolution of the abortion
issue will enable different groups of U.S. citizens to decide,
through the political process, state by state, which solution
best fits their needs.' 0 5 Proponents of legislative control also
assert that legislators are better suited than the judiciary to re-
solve this inherently complex issue. 10 6 Accordingly, scholars
seeking to bring the abortion question to the legislatures advo-
cate turning the question back to the people.10 7
Advocates of legislative compromise have championed the
recent Congressional effort to recapture the abortion ques-
tion.'0 8 In the decade after Roe, approximately 500 bills relat-
ing to abortion were introduced in Congress. 0 9 Legislators of
104. Ely, Wages, supra note 99, at 923. Professor Ely argues that the Court
should not challenge legislative compromise where the Constitution does not desig-
nate special protection to the values involved in the abortion question. Id.; see ALEX-
ANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSErr 28 (1975). "Should not the question...
have been left to the political process, which in state after state can achieve not one
but many accommodations, adjusting them from time to time as attitudes change?"
Id.; see Tribe, Foreword, supra note 45, at 32 (arguing that courts, not medical profes-
sion, have taken over responsibility to facilitate "the emergence of an alternative con-
sensus" when environment is one of widely-perceived moral flux); TRIBE, AMERICAN,
supra note 43, at 929 (defending Court's resolution of abortion issue). Professor
Tribe rejects deferring the question to the legislature. Id. Because the right-to-life
supporters who equate abortion with murder refuse to concede to a compromise that
permits abortion, Professor Tribe argues that deference to politics fails to satisfy the
ardent right-to-life advocate. Id. Moreover, Professor Tribe insists that the legisla-
tive deference argument fails to address the substantive issue, saying nothing about
how a legislator within the political process, who is bound to observe the Constitu-
tion, should act. Id.
105. GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 45-47.
106. Id.; see Dworkin, Great, supra note 97, at 49. For Professor Dworkin, al-
lowing the abortion issue to be decided by state politics will not mean that each wo-
man will be able to decide which solution best fits her individual convictions and
needs. Id. In actuality, women likely will be denied that opportunity given the
strength of the anti-abortion lobby. Id.
107, Ely, Wages, supra note 97, at 926 (arguing that abortion question belongs
with state legislatures).
108. Laurence Tribe, Write Roe Into Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1992, at A27; cf
Ely, Wages, supra note 97, at 923 (supporting state legislative protection of woman's
right to elect an abortion); see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 47 (advocating
state legislative attempts at compromise).
109. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355,
§ 1007(b)(8), 88 Stat. 385 (1974) (prohibiting lawyers in federally funded legal aid
programs from providing legal assistance for procuring non-therapeutic abortions);
see, e.g., Title IX of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 2011(a), 95 Stat. 592 (1981) (permits grants only to programs that do not provide
abortions, abortion counseling or referral); see also GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note
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the 102nd Congress proposed the Freedom of Choice Act of
1991.110 This act would prevent states from restricting the
right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability
and at all times where necessary to protect the life or health of
the woman."' Thus, this bill would, in effect, codify Roe and
overrule cases narrowing Roe."12
Similarly, the House of Representatives and the Senate
supported the Title X Pregnancy Counseling Act of 1991," '
vetoed by President Bush in September 1992. "' The bill in-
cluded language to overturn the Bush Administration's ban on
abortion counseling and referrals." 5 The escalated effort in
the House and Senate to push for immediate consideration of
the Freedom of Choice Act after the Casey decision signals the
return of the abortion question to the legislature." 16 This time,
however, the legislative activity is occurring in the federal leg-
islature, rather that at the state level." 17
16, at 49 (discussing the abortion bills passed by states). The majority of these pro-
posals sought to restrict the availability of abortions, although recently the bills
sought to make abortion more widely available. Id. In contrast, there were only 10
bills concerning abortion introduced in the 1960s. Id.
110. S. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The sponsors of the bill included Sen-
ators Mitchell, Cranston, Packwood, Metzenbaum, Kennedy, Adams, Bryan, Boren,
Binghaman, Mikulski, Pell, Simon, Akaka, Baucus, Bradley, Burdick, Chafee, Dodd,
Cohen, Fowler, Glenn, Inouye, Kerrey, Kerry, Kassebaum, Harkin, Kohl,
Lautenberg, Lieberman, Robb, Rockefeller, Seymour, Specter, Wellstone, and Wirth.
Id.
111. Id. In reaction to the Supreme Court's modification of Roe and the restric-
tive legislation following such modification, the proposed Freedom of Choice Act
mandates eliminating state regulations that "discriminate between women who are
able to afford interstate and international travel and women who are not, a dispro-
portionate number of whom belong to racial or ethnic minorities." Id. Ultimately,
the bill aims to eliminate state restrictions that "increase the number of illegal or
medically less safe abortions." Id.
112. Id.
113. S. 323, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
114. THOMAS CARR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ABORTION: LEGISLA-
TIVE CONTROL 1, CRS ISSUE BRIEF 88007 (1992).
115. S. 323, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
116. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
117. Id.; see Abortion About Face, TIME, Feb. 1, 1993, at 17 (discussing President
Clinton's executive orders regarding abortion). President Clinton issued an execu-
tive order which reversed three policies of the Bush Administration regarding abor-
tion. Id. First, the executive order lifted the "gag rule" on abortion counseling at
federally funded family planning clinics. Id. Second, the order lifted the prohibition
on fetal tissue research at military hospitals. Id. Last, the order removed restrictions
on funding for overseas population control programs. Id.
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2. Fundamental Rights Scholars Seek Compromise
Recognizing the impasse posed by the understanding of
abortion as a clash of absolutes,' 8 even the most steadfast fun-
damental rights scholars' 19 have begun to pursue compro-
mise. ' 2  The writings of renowned liberal fundamental rights
scholar Ronald Dworkin epitomize such a transformation.' 2'
Prior to Casey, Professor Dworkin lauded judicial insulation of
a woman's choice in the first trimester.' 22 Professor Dworkin
reasoned that people must be allowed to consult their own
consciences, crucial to the development of their personality
and sense of moral responsibility, rather than allowing society
to "thrust its collective decision upon them."' 121 Yet after
Casey, Professor Dworkin applauded the Court's recognition of
a state's interest in persuading its citizens to take decisions
about abortions more responsibly. 124 According to Professor
Dworkin, the community may desire that its citizens treat deci-
118. See TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 27 (discussing moral and philosophi-
cal issues prompted by question of which right to protect, mother's right to decide or
fetus' right to life).
119. Id.; see Dworkin, supra note 99, at 387 (discussing fundamental rights schol-
ars belief that Supreme Court should pronounce and guard individual fundamental
rights and enduring values drawn from the broad and abstract principles of Bill of
Rights). For Professor Dworkin, the Constitution is a scheme of abstract principles
that underlies the explicit text. Id.; see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516 (1981). Dworkinian judges would guard fundamental indi-
vidual rights, derived from the principles undergirding the text of the Constitution,
not merely a laundry list of specific rules. Id. at 516-17; see William Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986)
(stating that judges should protect fundamental rights).
120. Compare Tribe, Foreword, supra note 45, at 21-25 (refuting criticism of Roe
and any potential infringement upon woman's insulated decision in first trimester)
with TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 211 (discussing compromise solutions such as
better education, provision of contraception, and creation of society in which burden
of raising children is lighter).
121. Compare Dworkin, Great, supra note 97, at 49-50 (stating that abortion is
fundamental right of woman to decide, which should not be intruded upon or influ-
enced by public in first trimester) with Dworkin, Center, supra note 32, at 30 (stating
that state regulations encouraging women to think more seriously about their deci-
sion is one great merit of Casey joint opinion).
122. See Dworkin, Great, supra note 97, at 53 (arguing that "[tihejustices would
do best for constitutional order and decorum, as well as principle, if they refused to
take [the] bad advice" of overruling Roe).
123. Id. at 51.
124. Dworkin, Center, supra note 32, at 30. Professor Dworkin asserts that re-
quiring women to take their decisions seriously fits the legitimate state interest in
making women understand that the abortion decision involves fundamental moral
principles. Id. In contrast to his article years earlier, Professor Dworkin would up-
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sions about abortion as matters of moral importance, and that
they decide reflectively, not out of immediate convenience.1 25
Influenced by the moral dimensions of the abortion question,
Professor Dworkin appears to have moderated his own consti-
tutional theory in search of compromise. 126 Like the Casey de-
cision itself, compromise sentiment influences even the most
ardent fundamental rights scholars. 127
II. FUSING COMMUNITY VALUES WITH A WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO TERMINATE HER PREGNANCY- THE
WESTERN EUROPEAN WAY
In the 1970s, France and Italy, predominantly Roman
Catholic countries, passed abortion legislation.1'2  Responding
to popular support for the legalization of abortion, both coun-
tries passed abortion reform laws that simultaneously
decriminalized abortion and satisfied their respective commu-
nity's concerns for the fetus. 129 The French and Italian legisla-
tors achieved consensus by guaranteeing to the woman fund-
ing for her abortion decision while conditioning her right to
abortion upon mandatory counseling sessions, waiting peri-
ods, and discussions with her partner. 3 0 Both French and Ital-
ian reform abortion laws received resounding popular sup-
port. I1
hold responsibility-inducing state provisions "[s]o long ... as the state stops short of
dictating to its citizens which decision they must ultimately make." Id.
125. Ronald Dworkin, supra note 99, at 408.
126. See GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 44 (stating that even most promi-
nent defenders of Roe such as Laurence Tribe and Michael Perry have recanted their
earlier unquestioned approval of Roe).
127. Id. Two of Roe's prominent defenders, Professor Laurence Tribe and Pro-
fessor Michael Perry, modified their absolute approval of Roe in their recent writings.
Id. For example, Professor Tribe initially refuted all criticism of Roe because the
Court properly served as the ultimate arbiter regarding abortion. See id. Professor
Tribe later revised his reasoning and asserted that the Court should participate as
one important set of voices involving such a vital public issue. See id.
128. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, May 22,
1978, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
129. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, May 22,
1978, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at
43 (discussing 1975 French and 1978 Italian abortion legislation).
130. GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 19.
131. Id.
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A. Historical Background of Abortion in France and Italy
In 1975, France legalized abortion after three years of
heated debate in its legislature. 3 2 The 1975 abortion legisla-
tion marked the end of France's nearly 200-year history of
criminalizing abortion. 133  In 1810, the Code Napoleon pre-
scribed five-to-ten years penal servitude to both a woman and a
doctor participating in an abortion. 34 Until World War I, the
French government, however, rarely prosecuted individuals
for participating in abortion. 3 5 Indeed, the French govern-
ment prosecuted fewer than thirty women annually between
1880 and 1910.136 France, however, escalated its enforcement
of its abortion laws and enacted more severe penalties for
abortionists in the years following World War II. 137 Doctors
caught performing abortions received one to five years in
prison, together with heavy fines.' 3 8 Public dissatisfaction with
the abortion laws grew in the early 1970s. 139
Concerned with the increasing numbers of unsafe clandes-
tine abortions, 40 physicians joined forces with feminist groups
to protest the abortion laws.' 4 1 Public protest influenced legis-
132. See MALCOLM PoTrs ET AL., ABORTION 399 (1977) (discussing legislators at-
tempts to reform French law criminalizing abortion in 1973 and 1974); see also
Monique Drapier, La Loi Rilative a L 'Interruption Volontaire de Grossesse Dix Ans Apres:
Histoire d'Un Compromis, 101 REV. D. PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET
A L'ETRANGER 443, 450 (1985) (detailing Parliamentary debate in 1974 regarding
liberalization of abortion laws).
133. See PoTrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 380-81 (discussing France's nearly 200
year period of criminalizing abortion).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. In 1923, France introduced lesser sentences and fines for committing
abortion. Id. Disregarding the criminal laws which were rarely enforced, individuals
performed illegal abortions at a high rate. Id. at 381.
137. See PoTrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 382 (discussing 1939 Code de ia
Famille). In 1939, France enacted the Code de la Famille which barred physicians
who performed abortions from practicing medicine for five years. Id. Moreover, all
pregnancy tests had to be registered with local governments, deterring women away
from abortion. Id. The Vichy Government ranked abortion with crimes such as trea-
son and sabotage. Id. at 383. In 1942, France executed Mine Giraud for performing
26 abortions, the last known execution for the crime of abortion. Id. (citing G.
Fedou, L'AVORTEMENT. DE SA REPRESSION ET DE SA PRiVENTION DANS LE CODE DE LA
FAMILLE DET LOIS POSTfRIEURS (1946)).
138. Porrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 398.
139. Id.
140. Drapier, supra note 132, at 481.
141. Pors ET AL., supra note 132, at 397. In 1971, 300 prominent French wo-
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lators to draft a reform abortion bill in 1973.42 The bill pro-
posed the legalization of abortion where the woman's health
was endangered, in cases of rape and incest, and in cases in-
volving fetal defect.'4 The bill required the woman to wait
seven days to reflect upon her decision, parental consent for
women under eighteen, written application, and approval from
two physicians in order to obtain an abortion. 44 Because the
right wing of the Gaullist Party opposed the bill as too liberal
and liberal parties found the bill unacceptably restrictive, the
bill failed to muster enough votes for passage.' 45 Although the
1973 reform abortion legislation never passed, 46 public sup-
port behind the bill set the stage for the enactment of the 1975
bill. 14 7
Similarly, Italy, after 100 years of criminalizing abortion,
legalized abortion in 1978.148 Prior to World War I, Italy clas-
sified abortion as a crime against the family.' 49 Despite severe
abortion penalties in force during World War 11,150 illegal
abortions continued with casualties numbering in the
men signed a manifesto admitting that they had broken the abortion law. Id. In
1973, 345 French doctors signed a manifesto detailing their participation in abor-
tions. Id. Alongside their manifesto, French physicians in Grenoble openly per-
formed abortions free of charge in cooperation with the feminist organization
Choice, founded by Mine Simone de Beauvoir. Id. at 398. In May 1973, police ar-
rested a Grenoble doctor. Id. Incensed by the arrests, 3000 Grenoble citizens pro-
tested on behalf of the doctors. Id. Reform groups, such as the National Association
for the Study of Abortion, the French Movement for Family Planning, Choice, and
the Movement for Freedom of Abortion and Contraception, protested in the streets
and pressured political leaders to implement change in the law. Id. at 397-98.
142. Id. at 398 (discussing the proposed Abortion Reform Bill of 1973). In a
parliamentary debate, Minister of Justice M. Jean Taittinger disparaged the existing
"archaic and unjust" law. Id. He estimated that 1000 women obtained illegal abor-
tions daily and one woman died from those illegal abortions a day. Id.
143. See PoTrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 399.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Italian Abortion Law of 1978, Law No. 140, pt. 1, Gazz. Uff. (May 22,
1978), 1978 Lex. 871.
149. Figi-Talamanca, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 279
(Paul Sachdev ed., 1988) [hereinafter FigA-Talamanca]. The fascist regime changed
the law's emphasis to a crime against the Italian "race." Id.
150. PoTrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 382. A doctor performing an abortion
could receive two to 12 years in prison while a woman could be imprisoned for one to
five years. Id. The police, however, rarely enforced the law. Id.
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thousands annually. 151 Influenced by French popular support
for the legalization of abortion, 5 2 Italian feminist groups,15 3
doctors, and parliamentarians sought to bring the issue to a
popular vote by collecting votes for a referendum on the
law.' 54 Seeking to avoid the referendum, Parliament success-
fully modified the law by passing the compromise legislation of
1978.15 5
B. Current Abortion Law in France and Italy
Responding to heated demands from physicians and wo-
men's groups, French legislators passed reform abortion legis-
lation in 1975.156 The legislation established the right of a wo-
man in distress ("detresse") to obtain an abortion, 57 accompa-
nied in 1982 by legislation granting complete funding for her
abortion.'58 The abortion law, however, commanded that the
woman consider the interests of her community and family in
making her decision. 59 Italy passed a similar abortion law in
1978, also providing full payment for the woman's abortion
151. Id.
152. FigA-Talamanca, supra note 149, at 281. Covered by the Italian media,
French public debate on the issue served as a model and guide for the burgeoning
feminist groups in Italy. Id.
153. Id. at 281 (citing V. Barrouso, Abortion in Italy, ILA PALMA POLERMO (1982)).
In 1973, hundreds of prominent women publicly confessed that they had obtained
abortions. Id. Groups of women organized public protests, sit-ins, hunger strikes,
and operated free-standing abortion clinics. Id.
154. PoTrs ET AL., supra note 132, at 401-02 (citing What Italians Think, PANO-
RAMA, Aug. 1974, at 57-58. Reform groups successfully collected haifa million signa-
tures as required by the Italian Constitution to initiate a public referendum. PoTrs
ET AL., supra note 132, at 402. Conducted in 1974, a popular opinion poll indicated
that 75% of Italians favored legalizing abortion. Id. at 401 (citing What Italians Think,
supra, at 57-58).
155. Italian Abortion Law of 1978, Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642,
Lex. 871 (May 22, 1978); see Sari Gilbert, Italy's Parliament Approves Liberal Abortion
Law: LiberalAbortion Bill Passes in Italy, WASH. POST, May 19, 1978, at Al. Parliament
achieved success only after two failed proposals in 1976 and 1977. Id. The fight over
abortion legislation threatened Italy's political stability for the three years preceding
the 1978 compromise bill. Id.
156. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
157. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-1, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
158. Law No. 82-1172 of Dec. 31, 1982, 1983 J.O. 13, 1983 D.S.L. 86.
159. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-4, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 19 80J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
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decision. ' 60
1. Compromise Abortion Legislation in France
The French Abortion Law of 1975, guided by the general
principles of respect for every individual from the commence-
ment of life,' 6 ' makes abortion available, up to the tenth week
of pregnancy, to any woman whose condition places her in dis-
tress. 62  Providing that the woman individually determine
whether she is in distress, the statute prescribes several proce-
dures designed to make the pregnant woman aware of, and
able to choose, alternatives to abortion.' 63 First, the physician
attending to the woman in her initial request to terminate her
pregnancy must supply her with a brochure, detailing the law's
provision that the woman must be in distress.'4 Second, the
pregnant woman and her partner must meet with a govern-
ment-approved counseling service.' 6 5 Last, the woman must
160. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
161. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. 1, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154,
amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71. "The law
guarantees the respect of every human being from the commencement of life." Id.
162. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-1, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Drapier,
supra note 132, at 450. Requiring that the woman deem herself in "ditresse" (distress)
gave moral and philosophical value to the woman's decision. Id. Politicians intended
the ambiguous nature of "de'tresse" to allow women to evaluate their individual stress
and needs. Id. Moreover, lawmakers found it more reassuring that the decision to
abort involved "un drame" (a drama or momentous decision). Id.
163. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-3, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amendedby Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; see GLEN-
DON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 16 (explaining art. L. 162-3).
164. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-3, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amendedby Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71. More-
over, the brochure must contain information about the public benefits and programs
that are guaranteed to mothers and children, the possibilities of adoption, as well as
providing a list of organizations capable of giving assistance. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18,
1975, art. L. 162-3 (2)(a)-(d), 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by Law No. 79-
1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
165. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-4, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71. The
provision aims at making sure the woman understands the seriousness of the matter.
GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 156. The counselors give the woman advice
"especially with a view toward enabling her to keep her child." Law No. 75-17, Jan.
17, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by Law No. 79-1204,Jan 1, 1980,
1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; see Michel Hardouin, Grossesse et Libertide la Femme, 9-10
D. SOCIAL 287, 301-06 (Sept.-Oct. 1977) (noting that discussions are particularly ori-
ented toward dissuading women from terminating their pregnancy).
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wait one week after meeting with the physician before having
an abortion. 166 The legislature wanted the woman to have
time to weigh all of the elements of her decision in light of her
discussions with the doctor, the social agency, and her part-
ner. 167 After the tenth week of pregnancy, the French law per-
mits only therapeutic abortions, necessary to prevent danger
to the woman's life or in cases of severe fetal deformity.' 68 In
1979, French lawmakers added language to the legislation to
ensure the state's active promotion of respect for life, under-
scoring the importance of society's responsibility for chil-
dren. 69
Abortions are fully paid for by the French state. 7 0
Although the 1975 legislation failed to address whether wo-
men should be reimbursed for their abortions by Social Secur-
ity, proponents of abortion funding successfully achieved their
goals in 1982. 7 1 The 1982 legislators reasoned that since the
state considers abortion an "objective right" ("droit objective"),
society must reimburse the medical bill.' 72 Abortion funding
in France follows the French government's deeply entrenched
tradition of providing social services as an affirmative constitu-
tional right. 73
166. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 3-4, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
167. Drapier, supra note 132, at 454.
168. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. L. 162-12, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980 J.O. 4, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
169. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, art. 1, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154,
amended by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, art. 1, 19 80J.O. 4, 1980 D.S.L. 71. The
amended legislation demanded that a "provision of information on the problems of
life ... education towards responsibility, the acceptance of the child in society, and
family-oriented policy are national obligations." Id.
170. Law No. 82-1172, Dec. 31, 1982, art. L 283, 1983 J.O. 15, 1983 D.S.L. 86.
The law of December 31, 1982 charges all costs of an abortion to the state. Id.
171. Law No. 82-1172, Dec. 31, 1982, art. L-283, 1983J.O. 15, 1983 D.S.L. 86;
see Drapier, supra note 132, at 464 (discussing full funding provided by 1982 French
law).
172. Law No. 82-1172, Dec. 31, 1982, art. L-283, 1983J.O. 15, 1983 D.S.L. 86.
173. See David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
864, 867 (1986) (discussing French notion of affirmative rights in comparison with
U.S. legal tradition's emphasis on negative rights). In the 1791 Constitution, France
acknowledged the state's affirmative duty to provide a system of public assistance
aimed at providing "nourishment, suitable clothing, and the opportunity for a
healthy life" to all. Id. at 867 (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DES Lois (V.
Pritchard ed. 1898)). The French Constitution of 1946 provides that "[tihe Nation
ensures to the individual and the family the conditions necessary to their develop-
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Legislators who opposed the 1975 abortion bill presented
the new law to the Constitutional Council 74 for review. 175
The Constitutional Council held that the 1975 law affirmed no-
tions of liberty and did not violate constitutional principles.' 76
Pointing to the interest of the community and the liberty of the
woman, the Council noted that the preservation of the wo-
man's liberty must be joined with the concern of the commu-
nity for the woman.' 77 The Council concluded that it was
neither possible nor reasonable to find that a pregnant woman
ment" and "guarantees to all ... protection of health [and] material security." Id. at
865 (quoting CONST. pmbl. (Fr. 1946)).
174. James Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in
France, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1972). The Constitutional Council is the highest
court of review in France. Id. at 431. Until 1971, the Constitutional Council never
invalidated an act of Parliament on the grounds that it infringes a constitutionally
protected right of a citizen. Id. at 431-32. Striking down an act of Parliament in such
a manner was foreign to French constitutional tradition. Id. at 431; see MAURO CAP-
PELLETrI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 577 (1979) (trans-
lating Decision of July 16, 1971, Con. const., Fr., July 17, 1971, J.O. 7114 (1971)).
The Constitutional Council changed the role of the Council by declaring itself the
ultimate protector of individual liberties in itsJuly 16, 1971 decision. Id.; see Decision
ofJanuary 18, 1985, Con. const., Fr., 1986 D.S.Jur. 425 (1985) (holding that "it is up
to the legislator to effect the necessary balance between the respect of liberties and
preservation of the public order without which the exercise of these liberties could
not be assured."); Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in
France: The Conseil Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 316 (1988) (discuss-
ing Constitutional Council's January 18, 1985 decision).
175. Decision of Jan. 15, 1975, D.S. Jur. 529; J.O. Jan. 16, 1975, at 671.
176. Decision ofJan. 15, 1975, D.S.Jur. 529;J.O.Jan. 16, 1975, at 671; see Rob-
ert, supra note 22, at 874-81. Those who opposed the 1975 abortion law pointed to
three texts which the bill violated: the Preamble of the Constitution of 1858 which
deems all human beings as possessing inalienable and sacred rights; the Preamble of
the 1946 Constitution which guarantees protection of the health of all mothers and
their children; and Article 2 of the European Convention Safeguarding the Rights of
Man. Id. at 874-75. The opposition declared that a fetus has the same rights as a
newly born child. Id. at 876. Proponents of the new law responded that no constitu-
tional text explicitly guarantees state protection to the fetus. Id. For the Council, the
law is a law of liberty. Id. at 888. Because it is a law of liberty, it must be subject to
limitation "car il n existe point de vraie liberti sans barriere de la loi" (for there exists no
true liberty without the barrier of law). Id. at 888 (translation by Note author). The
Council's decision reflects French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau's notion that
there is no freedom for man without social order. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 52 (1955). French political philosophy embraces majoritarian rule.
Id.; compare generally with JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT (1963) (arguing American individualistic, right-bearer philoso-
phy that role of government is sole protector of individual's right to property).
177. Decision of Jan. 15, 1975, D.S.Jur. 529;J.O.Jan. 16, 1975, at 671; see Rob-
ert, supra note 22, at 884 (discussing Constitutional Council's January 15, 1975 deci-
sion regarding the 1975 abortion law).
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has no rights over the embryo that she carries. 178 To hold that
a woman has no such rights would attenuate the true liberty of
the woman who must be able to depend on the community to
support her decision. 79 French legal scholar Monique Drapier
argued that no fundamental right exists that authorizes the
mother to do what she likes with her body.' 80 For the Council,
the interests of the community and the pregnant woman to-
gether promote liberty.'"'
2. Italy Joins a Woman's Freedom to Terminate Her
Pregnancy with Societal Concerns
The Italian abortion law of 1978,182 a compromise be-
tween opponents and proponents of abortion rights, begins
with a declaration of the state's commitment to protect human
life from its inception. 83 During the first ninety days of preg-
nancy, a woman may request an abortion where the pregnancy
would seriously endanger her physical and mental health, in
light of her state of health, economic, social, or family circum-
stances, and the circumstances in which conception oc-
curred.' 84 By allowing the woman to decide if she is endan-
gered, the abortion law guarantees her the right to conscious
and responsible procreation, while recognizing the value of
motherhood. 18 5
Like the French statute, the Italian law imposes mandatory
counseling sessions and a legally prescribed seven-day period
of reflection before terminating the pregnancy.' 86 The coun-
178. Decision of January 15, 1975, D.S. Jur. 529; J.O. Jan. 16, 1975, at 671.
179. Decision of January 15, 1975, D.S. Jur. 529;J.O. Jan. 16, 1975, at 671; see
Robert, supra note 22, at 889 (discussing Constitutional Council's January 15, 1975
decision).
180. Drapier, supra note 132, at 477.
181. Decision of January 15, 1975, D.S. Jur. 529; J.O. Jan. 16, 1975, at 671; see
Drapier, supra note 132, at 477 (discussing Constitutional Council decision of Janu-
ary 15, 1975).
182. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
183. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871. The Italian Abor-
tion Law of 1978 proclaims the state's commitment to "protect human life from its
inception." Id.; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 163 n.51 (translating Arti-
cle 1 of 1978 Italian abortion law).
184. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
185. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see FigA-
Talamanca, supra note 149, at 28-82 (discussing 1978 Italian abortion law).
186. Law No. 140, pt. 1, art. 5, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLEN-
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seling sessions must be designed with respect for the dignity
and personal feelings of the woman. 8 7 As in the French law,
the Italian law requires the woman and her partner to consult
with a social counselor regarding the woman's decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy. 88 Including a role for the father into
the woman's decision convinced many Senators to vote for the
bill.' 8 9 As part of the national health service, the government
pays for the woman's abortion.' 90
Italy initially encountered protest from the Catholic
Church over the new law.' 91 Yet, a popular referendum in
1981 defeated attempts to change the law.' 92 Italians voted to
affirm the abortion law by a two-to-one margin.' 93 Since 1981,
no attempts have been made to alter the 1978 abortion law.' 94
III. WESTERN EUROPEAN "RESPONSIBILITY TALK"
VERSUS U.S. "RIGHTS TALK": CASEY HEADS IN THE
WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECTION
Two Western European countries, France and Italy,
forged a national consensus on the abortion issue by wedding
their respective community's interests with the woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy.' 95 Providing funding for the wo-
man's choice, both countries require that the woman deliber-
ate concerning her decision with her partner, family, and fam-
DON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 164 n.51 (translating Article 5 of Italian abortion
law).
187. Law No. 140, pt. 1, arts. 5, 14, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
188. Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see Gilbert, supra
note 155, at Al (discussing 1978 abortion law's consultation requirement).
189. Gilbert, supra note 155, at Al. The 1976 abortion bill failed in part because
several Senators objected to the omission of the father's role. Id.
190. FigA-Talamanca, supra note 149, at 282.
191. Sari Gilbert, Anti-Abortion Pressure by Vatican Seen: Move to Thwart Italy's Law,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1978, at A16. Fierce protest from the church followed the
passing of the 1978 abortion bill. Id. Pope Paul VI threatened excommunication for
doctors performing abortions and right to life groups protested at hospitals that per-
formed abortions. Id. Pope Paul VI called upon high-ranking bishops to recruit doc-
tors to conscientiously object to performing abortions. Id.
192. FigA-Talamanca, supra note 149, at 282.
193. Italy: Abortion Lives, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1981, at 60.
194. Id.
195. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978
Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 43 (discuss-
ing compromise legislation in France and Italy).
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ily planning counselors. 9 6 In recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions, most prominently in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
9 7
abortion law in the United States appears to be moving in the
Western European direction.' 98 The Court in Casey permitted
state legislatures to require that a woman consider the commu-
nity's concerns in making her decision.' 9 9 Unlike the Western
European example, however, the Court and states have re-
fused to recognize the reciprocal responsibility of the commu-
nity to pay for the abortion.200
A. Western European Responsibility Ethic
As shown above, France's 1975 abortion law protects the
woman's decision concerning the termination of her preg-
nancy by fusing the community's interests with the woman's
right to control her body.2 0' The 1975 French legislation joins
freedom with responsibility in an effort to protect the woman's
liberty.20 2 By requiring the woman to wait and to participate in
196. Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18, 1975, article L. 162-4, 1975J7O. 739, 1975 D.S.L.
154, amended by Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No.
140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
197. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
198. See GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 52 (urging United States to fol-
low Western European example regarding abortion).
199. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. The Court asserted that
[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which
the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound re-
spect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose .... [A] state mea-
sure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be
upheld if reasonably related to that goal.
Id.
200. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S 297, 298 (1980) (upholding constitutionality
of federal legislation denying funding for abortions); see also Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (upholding as constitutional state refusal to
fund abortion counseling).
201. Hardouin, supra note 165, at 299; see supra notes 161-73 and accompanying
text (discussing French abortion legislation); see also Drapier, supra note 132, at 481.
According to French legal scholar Monique Drapier, "[w]hat is essential to under-
stand is that the life of the embryo is not the question, but the rights of the mother,
the father, the public order, the society organized with its deficiencies, its focus, and
its moral values." Id.
202. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; see Hardouin, supra note
165, at 287. French society perceives pregnancy as a state of weakness. Id. Witness-
ing the woman in such a state, society seeks to protect the woman. Id. At the same
time, the woman's state of weakness, pregnancy, stirs the state to endow her with
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counseling sessions with her partner, the law aims to ensure
that the woman thinks seriously about her decision.2"' The
woman in France, however, understands that the community
will support and pay for her ultimate decision. 0 4
Prevailing French thought underscores the notion that
separating the woman from her community when she makes
the serious decision of abortion ultimately dilutes her free-
dom.2 5 Disassociating the woman from society in her decision
encourages the woman's partner and society to flee their re-
sponsibility to protect the woman, a valued partner and mem-
ber of the community.20 6 Illustrated by the law's mandate that
the woman discuss the issue with her partner, a social coun-
selor, and her physician, the French abortion law inextricably
links the woman's free choice with her responsibility to society,
as well as society's responsibility to the woman.20 7
Similarly, the Italian abortion law of 1978 predicates a wo-
man's liberty to terminate her pregnancy upon her making the
decision with reflection.20 8 Italian legal scholars explain that
understanding abortion as a private affair contradicts Italian
society's communitarian ethic. 20 9 Like the French decision to
provide the pregnant woman with financial freedom in her
choice, 210 Italian society fulfills its reciprocal obligation to sup-
port the woman financially in her decision, either in carrying
the fetus to term or in terminating the pregnancy.21 '
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 299. The French law
seeks to satisfy both goals. Id.
203. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204,Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; see GLENDON, ABORTION,
supra note 16, at 16 (noting that 1975 French abortion law encourages woman to
think reflectively about her decision regarding termination of her pregnancy).
204. GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 18.
205. Hardouin, supra note 165, at 299.
206. Id.
207. Law No. 75-17, Jan. 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended by
Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71.
208. Law No. 140, May 22, 1978, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see Bi-
anca, supra note 22, at 235 (discussing 1978 Italian abortion law).
209. Bianca, supra note 22, at 225. The Italian abortion law establishes a wo-
man's rights within a body of law designed to protect the supremacy of the commu-
nity. Id. As such, Italians share in the responsibilities that accompany the commu-
nity's support of its citizens. Id.
210. Law No. 82-1172, Dec. 31, 1982, art. L-283, 1983J.O. 15, 1983 D.S.L. 86.
211. Law No. 140, May 22, 1978, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see Bi-
anca, supra note 22, at 232 (discussing 1978 Italian abortion law).
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Taking responsibility seriously, 1 embraced by the Italian
and French abortion legislation, upholds the woman's freedom
as co-extensive with society's goals and responsibilities.21 3
Abortion compromise legislation in both France and Italy ef-
fectively codifies their shared ethic of demanding reciprocal re-
sponsibility from the community and the individual. 2 4 The
Western European experience, exemplified by France and It-
aly, urges joining the woman to the community regarding
abortion, not leaving her alone as a "lone rights-bearer. 21 5
B. Abortion in the United States Moves from the Traditional
American "Lone Rights-Bearer" Approach to "Responsibility Talk"
Unlike French and Italian legislation, the Court in Roe v.
Wade insulated the woman from community scrutiny in the first
trimester of her pregnancy.2 16 The Roe decision, followed by
Akron and Thornburgh, championed the isolation of the woman
from state regulation as fundamental to securing the woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy.2 7 The Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions, however, upheld state regulations that require
the woman to reflect upon her decision in light of the society's
interests.218 Imposing societal concerns upon the woman in
the first trimester signals a move in the Western European di-
rection. 2 t9 Federal and state legislatures in the United States,
212. West, supra note 3, at 79. "Taking responsibility seriously" means that the
zealous protection of individual rights in liberal societies fails to protect those rights
adequately. Id. Only by refocusing society towards shared responsibilities of each
individual member to the collective whole and "taking responsibility seriously" can
the freedoms of a liberal society be best secured. Id. at 85.
213. GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 53.
214. Id. at 19-23.
215. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Glendon's
"lone rights-bearer" thesis).
216. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
217. Id. at 163; see Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
450 (1983) (protecting women from community scrutiny in first trimester by striking
down waiting periods), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2816 (1992) (upholding 24-hour waiting period in first trimester); see also Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding unconsti-
tutional regulations in first trimester, including reporting requirement), overruled by
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (holding reporting requirements in first trimester constitu-
tional).
218. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding
state regulations in first trimester); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (upholding 24-
hour waiting period and other regulations in first trimester).
219. See GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 52-55 (discussing French and
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however, refuse to fund the woman's choice, and so have not
fully emulated the Western European experience.22 °
1. The U.S. Government's Amicus Curiae Brief in Webster
Praises the Western European Example Yet Fails to Adhere
to the Fundamental Principles Underlying the Western
European Legislation
Roe and its progeny before Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services22 I affirmed the right of the woman in the first trimester
to elect an abortion, guided only by her physician and not by
the state, the woman's parents, or her spouse.222 The Court
judicially isolated the woman from public scrutiny in her
choice. 223 Before the Court's decision in Webster, such isola-
tion affirmed the woman's fundamental right to control her
body while liberating her choice from societal influence.224
Such isolation, Professor Glendon has argued, illustrates the
"lone rights-bearer" thesis in American law. 2 5 The Court re-
fused to infringe upon the woman's right to privacy in the first
trimester and upheld the right of individual autonomy as virtu-
ally absolute.226 Isolating the woman in the first trimester
from state regulation provided protection to the lone rights of
the woman, to the exclusion of societal interests.22 7 In that
Italian compromise abortion legislation aimed to reconcile woman's liberty interest
with community's concerns).
220. GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 53-54.
221. Webster, 492 U.S at 522.
222. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). The Court in
Danforth rejected parental and spousal vetoes of a woman's decision to abort. Id. at
72; see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing Court's protection of
woman from state regulation in first trimester prior to Webster).
223. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2825 (1992) (regarding constitu-
tionality of 24-hour mandatory waiting periods) (holding unconstitutional restric-
tions in first trimester); see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (holding woman's right to terminate her pregnancy as unencum-
bered by state regulation in first trimester), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (re-
garding reporting requirements).
224. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 (striking down state regulations in first tri-
mester); see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing Thornburgh's insula-
tion of woman in first trimester from community scrutiny).
225. GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 59; see supra note 8 and accompanying
text (discussing U.S. lone rights-bearer legal tradition).
226. See GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 58-59.
227. See id. at 59 (arguing that lone rights-bearer paradigm prevailed in cases
after Roe).
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sense it reflected, in Justice Brandeis's immortal words, "the
right to be let alone. 22 8
The Western European example served as a model and
guide for the U.S. government's amicus brief for the appellant
in Webster. 229 The U.S. government defended the community's
interest in making the woman's decision more informed and
responsive to the community's concern for the fetus. 2 3' The
U.S. government's briefs enthusiastically advanced the thesis
that European abortion laws are significantly different from
and superior to U.S. laws. 23' The U.S. government, however,
ignored the dual dimensions of the Western European experi-
ence, that the woman's responsibility to the community is inte-
grally bound to the community's responsibility to pay for the
woman's decision.2 2 Precisely because those countries' laws
require the woman to act more responsively to the commu-
nity's interests, those countries' laws guarantee full payment of
the woman's choice in abortion or in childbirth.23 3
Both the U.S. government's amicus brief and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Webster mandated that a wo-
man's choice be more responsible but failed to support federal
funding for abortion counseling.23 4 In Webster, the Court up-
held state legislation denying funding for abortion counsel-
ing.23 5 The Court in Webster failed to understand that denying
228. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissent-
ing).
229. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States in Support of Appellant at 23-
24, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (lauding
Western European compromise legislation that joined community concerns with wo-
man's right to terminate her pregnancy).
230. Id.
231. Id. But see Brief of Amici Curiae International Women's Health Organiza-
tions in Support of Appellees at 2-20, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (rebutting Professor Glendon's thesis).
232. Olsen, supra note 68, at 116.
233. Law No. 82-1172, Jan. 1, 1983, art. L. 283, 1983 J.O. 3, 1983 D.S.L. 86;
Law No. 140, pt. 1, 1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION,
supra note 16, at 54-57 (discussing French and Italian funding of abortion).
234. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States in Support of Appellant, Web-
ster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 523-530 (1989) (O'Connor J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (supporting Court's previous holdings regarding consti-
tutionality of state and federal legislation denying funding for abortions and uphold-
ing increase in cost of abortions related to viability testing as constitutional).
235. Webster, 492 U.S. at 523.
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federal funding for abortion counseling impedes an indigent
woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy as
mandated by Roe." 6 Yet, as the prevailing jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court illustrates, only privileged women in the
United States fully enjoy the right to choose an abortion.23 7
2. Casey Moves in the Western European Direction
The Court in Casey allowed society to force its concern for
more thoughtful decision-making upon the woman in the first
trimester.238 Justice O'Connor asserted in Casey that the wo-
man has the right only to make the ultimate decision, but does
not have a right to be insulated from all others in so doing.23 9
This assertion signals an acceptance of something like the
Western European concept of wedding community values with
the woman's choice. The Court in Casey approved the imposi-
tion of a more reflective choice upon the woman by upholding
the twenty-four hour waiting period.240 Moreover, the Court
allowed the presentation of community-oriented arguments to
the woman before she makes her decision.24  Thus, the Court
in Casey effectively redirected U.S. abortion jurisprudence in
the Western European direction.24 2
Mandating that women be more thoughtful in their deci-
sion-making 243 and take reproductive responsibilities and free-
236. Id. at 522.
237. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding federal refusal
to fund abortions constitutional); see supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Court's refusal to create affirmative duty for states to provide funding); see
Olsen, supra note 68, at 116 (discussing Hyde Amendment's effective denial of poor
women's right to terminate pregnancy); see also Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 330, 337 (1985) (noting that government's choice in denying funding for
non-therapeutic abortions ultimately sacrifices poor woman's freedom to terminate
her pregnancy).
238. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2825 (1992).
239. Id. at 2821.
240. Id. at 2816.
241. Id. ; see supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text (discussing Casey decision).
242. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (upholding state regulations aimed to persuade
women to be more thoughtful in their decisions concerning abortion and elect child-
birth over abortion).
243. Compare id. at 2826 with Jane Maslow Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Mar-
ketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1253 (1989) (predicating woman's right to abor-
tion upon waiting period or counseling sessions with social worker fetters woman's
autonomy); cf. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 203. "What women who would take
lightly the decision to have an abortion will rethink it more seriously simply because a
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dom seriously, 244 as the Court in Casey demands, also should
entail making the community accountable for such regula-
tions.245 Redirecting society toward shared responsibilities
means that society must also share in the collective responsibil-
ity such as providing meaningful material assistance to aid a
woman in her choice to bear to term or abort the fetus.2 4 6
Faithful adherence to the Western European example would
mean accompanying the regulations aimed at encouraging
more thoughtful decisions with funding for the woman's ulti-
mate decision to terminate her pregnancy or to keep the child.
Providing meaningful material assistance to the woman should
include paying for the woman's expenses that accompany ter-
minating a pregnancy or bearing the child. Such assistance
should include travel costs and days spent away from her job,
counseling regarding her decision, and helping the woman
bear and support a child, should she forgo terminating her
pregnancy.47 Material assistance, however, should not be lim-
ited to the above-mentioned suggestions. Furthermore, state
legislatures should implement programs designed to prevent
law says she has to wait a day before having the procedure?" Id.; see Tribe, Foreword,
supra note 45, at 37. According to Professor Tribe
any notion that the doctor, or some other disinterested expert, is in a better
position than the woman and her family, by virtue of such disinterest and
expertise, not only to provide advice and consultation but also to make the
final choice with respect to whether the family should have and raise a child,
amounts to nothing more than a denial of the underlying first amendment
premise that groups should ordinarily have the role of making their ultimate
associational choices, informed and perhaps influenced, but not forced by
others.
Id.
244. West, supra note 3, at 85. But see Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 171 (1992) (arguing that taking rights seriously may
require insulation of right holder to secure right).
245. Id.; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 53. "The European experi-
ence leads one to wonder why pregnant women in the United States should be asked
to make significant sacrifices [whether they abort or bear children], if absent fathers
and the community as a whole are not asked to sacrifice too." Id.; see Tribe, Foreword,
supra note 45, at 45. "Having concluded that government cannot usurp the woman's
role of personal decision with respect to early abortion, one might ultimately be able
to conclude that government must assume, directly or indirectly, the affirmative role
of providing access to the means of preventing unwanted pregnancy and or terminat-
ing it if it occurs." Id.
246. Tribe, Foreword, supra note 45, at 45.
247. See Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended
by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1,
1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871.
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unwanted pregnancies such as sex education programs and
providing condoms at schools.24 8
The Court in Casey did not explicitly address whether the
state regulations carry communal responsibilities to the wo-
man. 249 The government should support the woman's abor-
tion decision by equally promoting both the woman's and the
state's interests.250 Moreover, state legislatures should ensure
that clinics and hospitals provide the safest procedures avail-
able, counsel the woman in her choice, and help her pay for it.
Casey seemingly moves beyond the Court's traditional ap-
proach of protecting individual rights as negative rights to be
free from government restrictions.25 ' The "lone rights-
bearer" is no longer allowed to exercise a "right to be let
alone. ' 252  Understanding privacy as a negative right means
telling states What not to do, rather than creating duties for
states.253 The previous treatment of privacy in the U.S. legal
tradition as a negative right opposes the communitarian ethic
of French and Italian society, which demands affirmative duties
from society. Casey's creation of positive duties for women to
society, however, signifies a shift in the Court's traditional in-
terpretation from individual rights as negative rights, including
the right to be left alone, to individual rights that entail affirm-
ative obligations to society, exemplified by the French and Ital-
248. TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 2, at 208.
249. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (failing to mention
any responsibility owed by community to pay for woman's abortion).
250. See Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18,. 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended
by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1,
1978 Gazz. Uff. 3642, 1978 Lex. 871; see GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16, at 53
(urging United States to fund abortion). "If the state is once again to restrict the
availability of abortion and to affirm the value of unborn life, it should in all fairness
strive to help those who bear and raise children, not only during pregnancy but also
after childbirth." Id.
251. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that Constitution
does not entail affirmative obligations on federal government to provide abortion
funding); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 202-
03 (1989) (holding that Constitution's Due Process Clause does not impose any af-
firmative obligation on state government to provide individuals with certain minimal
levels of safety and security); Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.)
(holding that Constitution is a "charter of negative rather than positive liberties"),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983).
252. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
253. Leslie Francis, Virtue and the American Family, 102 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486
(1988) (reviewing GLENDON, ABORTION, supra note 16).
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ian abortion legislation.254 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution does not confer upon individu-
als an affirmative right to government aid,255 Casey permits
states to construct affirmative duties for women contemplating
abortion.25 6
In short, if U.S. abortion law completes its movement
from taking individual rights seriously to taking individual re-
sponsibilities seriously, the United States must also move, to
some extent, from the view of the government as limited only
by negative liberties to a view of the government as having af-
firmative obligations to fund the individual's responsible deci-
sion-making. Creating affirmative duties for citizens, such as
requiring women to reflect upon their abortion decision,
should entail the creation of reciprocal affirmative duties of the
government. 25 7 By this shift, the Court and legislatures must
recognize the government's missing affirmative obligation to
promote the woman's welfare in her abortion decision.
In order to attain genuine compromise on the abortion
question, state legislatures must accompany imposing of com-
munity values on the woman's decision with providing public
assistance. Funding the woman's decision, as the French and
Italian legislation provide, simultaneously satisfies the commu-
nity's call to responsibility and meaningfully secures the abor-
tion decision for all women, both poor and wealthy. 258 As evi-
denced by the French and Italian examples, compromise legis-
lation can solve the abortion question aptly. 59 Scholars
calling for a legislative resolution of the abortion issue should
also urge the community to accompany regulations mandating
reflective decisions with public funding of the woman's ulti-
mate decision.260 Ignoring the community's reciprocal respon-
254. See West, supra note 3, at 83 (arguing for civic responsibility).
255. See GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99 (arguing that U.S. discourse
misses language of responsibility).
256. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992).
257. See GLENDON, RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 108 (urging community to provide
financial support for citizens and infuse U.S. tradition with missing dimension of re-
sponsibility for individual and state).
258. See Law No. 75-17,Jan. 18, 1975, 1975J.O. 739, 1975 D.S.L. 154, amended
by Law No. 79-1204, Jan. 1, 1980, 1980J.O. 3, 1980 D.S.L. 71; Law No. 140, pt. 1,
1978 Gazz. Uff. 3246, 1978 Lex. 871.
259. Ely, Wages, supra note 97, at 943 (arguing that abortion question should be
dealt with by legislatures, not Court).
260. See supra notes 101-18 and accompanying text (discussing movement in
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sibility to the woman effectively vitiates the poor woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy.
CONCLUSION
In order to take responsibility seriously regarding the
abortion question, the U.S. Supreme Court and state and fed-
eral legislatures should recognize the community's responsibil-
ity to care for the pregnant woman's choice. Upholding com-
munity values means accepting common responsibility.26' The
government's briefs in Webster lauding the Western European
compromise poignantly resound of irony, if not hypocrisy.
The government supported the denial of public funding for
abortions while the Western European experience demands
such community responsibility to fund the woman's abortion
counseling and her ultimate decision. 62 In light of the wo-
man's newly enunciated duty to bear in mind her community's
interests in her choice, the refusal to fund abortions publicly in
the United States not only precludes a woman's meaningful ex-
ercise of her fundamental right but denies the community's re-
ciprocal responsibility to the woman. Permitting abortions in
the absence of public funding merely subordinates the woman
and treats her unwanted pregnancy as a deviant event. 263 Ac-
cordingly, the woman's choice is not supported by the commu-
nity but instead is denied its deserved efficacy.
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scholarly community to bring ultimate decision concerning abortion back to legisla-
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